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Policy Brief

Reimagining IMEC: Trade Connectivity among GVC Clusters in Asia, North Africa and Europe

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This policy paper is authored by Anita Prakash, Head of Research Lab Asia, Trade and Infrastructure for Emerging Economies and Global South, on the occasion of the 2nd Cairo Forum, 3-4 November 2025.

Introduction

In the 21st century, all connectivity plans have Asia at its core. Asia, particularly Southeast and East Asia, has been a model of trade and economic cooperation, and much of this region's prosperity is due to its hard and soft connectivity efforts. The merits of such linkages continue with the India-Middle East - Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) too.

Asia is the centre of pan-regional connectivity initiatives. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), The EU's Global Gateway, and the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) – all regional connectivity plans – aim to deepen Asia's economic dynamism and extend it to trans-regional partners. Mega-regional integration initiatives like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are also integral to this region. The European Union (EU) has also put in place building blocks for an EU strategy on connecting Europe and Asia, with concrete policy proposals and initiatives, including through interoperable transport, energy, and digital networks. The European strategy aims for sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based connectivity. The United States (US) initiated the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network to improve capacities in partner countries' project evaluation processes and project implementation, provide advisory services to support sustainable infrastructure, and coordinate US assistance support for infrastructure in the region. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, 2018 is an important part of US connectivity policy in Asia. (Prakash, 2023).

The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) is the latest initiative among the G7 countries, led by the United States, for funding infrastructure projects across the world, especially among the developing regions. The IMEC is conceived under the PGII of Group of Seven (G7) but agreed and operationalised in the Group of Twenty (G20).

This policy brief explains why IMEC is more than an economic or infrastructure corridor. Using the trade data from Asia, Europe and North Africa, it explains how IMEC should be reimagined as a wide spatial design of production centers, markets, and GVC clusters which can function organically in the contiguous regions in and around the IMEC's planned economic corridor. In this design, North Africa - especially Egypt and Morocco - and Türkiye are the extended and complementary centers of manufacturing, markets, and industrial placement. Viewed from the international trade theory, these complementary

economies and markets deepen and expand the economic connectivity and productivity in the IMEC.

The Rationale and Imperative of IMEC

The IMEC was conceived as an infrastructure plan and was first announced in June 2021 during the G7 (or Group of Seven) summit in the UK. The G7 countries include the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the European Union (EU). US President Joe Biden had called it the Build Back Better World (B3W) framework.

In 2022, during the G7 summit in Germany, the PGII was officially launched as a joint initiative to help fund infrastructure projects in developing countries through public and private investments. President Biden explained it as a collective programme with an aim to mobilise nearly $600 billion from the G7 by 2027 "to invest in critical infrastructure that improves lives and delivers real gains for all of our people."

As the G7 recognises the contours of China-led programmes for infrastructure funding among the developing countries under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the PGII is G7's alternative mechanism to help secure funding for countries to build critical infrastructure such as roads, ports, bridges, communication setups, etc. to enhance global trade and cooperation.

In the Indian presidency of G20, Prime Minister Narendra Modi brought the Global South into the forefront of the development efforts in the G20. Working closely with the G7 members, Prime Minister Modi announced that the PGII can contribute towards reducing the infrastructure gaps in the Global South countries.

On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in New Delhi, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Governments of India, the US, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, the UAE, France, Germany and Italy to establish the India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor.

The IMEC is being envisioned as a network of transport corridors, including railway lines and sea lanes, that is expected to aid economic growth through integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe.

On a day prior to the G20 Summit in New Delhi, Prime Minister Modi attended the ASEAN-India Summit in Jakarta on 7 September 2023, where he stated his vision to prepare a *Multi-Modal Connectivity* and *Economic Corridor* which connects ***Southeast***

Asia, India, West Asia, and *Europe* which will focus on Logistics, Supply Chains, Infrastructure, Clean Energy and Solar Grid connectivity. In this plan, the Trilateral Highway and the IMEC will be the connecting infrastructure plans for bringing Asia and Europe closer and bring the developing countries of Southeast and East Asia closer through inclusive, transparent, and diversified connectivity. This vision of India for regional connectivity is important in understanding why IMEC must be re-imagined as a trade connectivity plan to bring the GVC clusters and trade links in Asia, Africa and Europe closer and to converge towards complementarity.

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

Prior to IMEC, the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) was envisioned by India, with due support from Japan, to establish trade and investment linkages between economic growth centres in Asia and Africa. The vision document of the AAGC – the 'Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development'[1] – was presented at the African Development Bank annual meeting on 25 May 2017 in Ahmedabad, India. The AAGC foresees Africa's economic connectivity with Asia, in which South Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania play an important part. The projects in AAGC were to promote connectivity and cooperation to bring peoples, goods, services, capital, and institutions closer to realise the objective of an Asia–Africa partnership for sustainable and innovative development.

The AAGC plan, however, was diluted in the wake of global attention towards US-China trade tensions and tariff wars during 2017 - 2018 and thereafter, in the global efforts towards diversifying and restoring the supply and demand of finished and intermediate goods during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) years. The plan though has not lost its relevance for regional connectivity and prosperity among developing Asia and Africa as explained in the sections below.

Global Focus on Resilient and Diversified GVCs

The Global Value Chain (GVC) participation is the key to economic growth among both developed and developing economies. Free, fair, and transparent GVCs are crucial for global governance of trade. The inclusion of emerging and developing countries, as key suppliers, producers and purchasers in global supply chains, is an important outreach and

[1] Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development. https://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf

cooperation agenda for G7. The G20 similarly has also adopted the framework for keeping critical GVCs resilient and robust.

The COVID-19 pandemic led to some negative shocks in the supply chains in the initial phase, especially for critical goods such as medical equipment and essential medical kits, revealing the 'China Centrality' in the regional and global value chains. The COVID-19 pandemic has especially reinforced the need for more equitable distribution of infrastructure and capacities, and investments in new centers of production, supply chains, and consumer/supplier clients. The COVID-19 pandemic experience of supply and demand shocks has given impetus to further balancing of GVCs and investments in supply chains in terms of distance, reliability, and vertical integration. These aspects of GVC participation predate the US–China trade tensions, the COVID-19 related shocks to supply chains, and the tariff turmoil in the second term of President Donald Trump. The latter two have only intensified policy actions amongst governments to establish a network of trade and investment in the supply chains, which integrates the strategic and economic interests under familiar if not the same rules of engagement. (Prakash, 2023).

G20 and G7 have Backed the IMEC for Inclusive and Resilient GVCs

In 2023, the year in which the world emerged fully from the Covid-19 induced social and economic restrictions on movement of people and goods, G7 and G20 meetings were hosted by developed and emerging economies of Asia – namely Japan and India respectively. Both hosts underlined the importance of trade-led development and prosperity. Japan as a key player in global supply chains and India as an important market as well as an emerging production base were ideal for converging the demands for more equitable and inclusive value chains where the conditions of transparency, reliability, and resilience are met.

The Hiroshima G7 Communique came out especially in favour of economic resilience and economic security. The leaders emphasized that economic resilience and economic security globally are the 'best protection against the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities.' (G7, 2023a).

It is important to note here that trust and security are the implicit or stated terms in new supply chains dialogues, whether it is in G7, G20, or in the regional processes such as the ASEAN summit. The G7 Trade Ministers in their statement in Osaka-Sakai in April 2023 highlighted the importance of resilient supply chains among trusted partner

countries through transparency, diversification, security, sustainability, and reliability. (G7, 2023b).

In a similar measure, the G20 Trade Ministers in Jaipur, India, have also adopted the Framework for keeping critical GVCs resilient and robust. Analysis of data, collaboration, coordination, preparedness and inclusion and sustainability are some of the high-level principles adopted in the G20 that can guide the like-minded countries towards resilient and reliable supply chains. (G20 2023).

Establishing the Interlinkage between Sub-regional Trade and Connectivity in the IMEC

Connectivity plans in Southeast and East Asia use trade for growth and prosperity among developing and developed economies alike. For example, the strength of developing Asia— which includes Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India—lies in strong production networks and resilient supply chains. Similarly, ASEAN and East Asia have strong manufacturing capacities and efficient supply chains. ASEAN and East Asia provide a very useful blueprint for the IMEC to resolve its political and strategic challenges and explore the opportunities that abound in the sub-regions between Asia and Europe, while taking North African economies together to maximize the efficiency and prosperity among participating economies. To do this, IMEC must not be viewed as a linear connectivity plan between Asia and Europe. It should be reimagined as cluster of GVCs functioning among growth nodes and poles. Economic corridors are *complementary* in nature and *not exclusionary*. Therefore, bringing in the important economies of North Africa, to begin with, will be important for the spatial influence of the IMEC corridor. In this context, the Suez Canal will be complementary to the economies in and around IMEC and not considered as an exclusionary channel for trade in goods. (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Economic Clusters and Production Centres in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and MENA Region



Source: Author. Economic clusters are improvised over a stock image of map of Asia, Africa and Europe.

Economic Clusters in Southeast Asia

It is instructive to note how successful GVC clusters function in the Southeast Asia. While formally in the ASEAN group, the IMT-GT (Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle) economic cooperation[2] is a sub-regional cooperation mechanism for promoting growth through greater regional economic integration and innovation, and for conserving and investing in IMT-GT's natural capital. The working groups in this economic cooperation sub-group enable important economic and social verticals of transport and ICT connectivity, trade and investment facilitation, environment, and human resource development, education and culture. The IMT-GT subregional trade increased from USD 367.9 billion in 2019 to USD 659.7 billion in 2023. It comprises about 48 percent of intra-ASEAN trade of US$ 763 billion in 2023 and about 10 percent of ASEAN's total trade of US$3526 billion in 2023[3]. (ASEANStats)

Similarly, the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA)4 is another important sub-regional cluster of economic cooperation which contributes to the economic dynamism of ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Leaders of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines issued a joint statement at the 16th BIMP-EAGA Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 27 May 2025 and adopted the new BIMP-EAGA Vision 2035 Guiding Framework, which will define the subregion's development path over the next decade.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are at the center of industrial policy in the four BIMP-EAGA countries. The BIMP-EAGA subregion, also exemplifies the challenges of economic growth where the remote and rural areas are left behind in the strong growth of industrial estates in national capitals and economic centers. According to an Asian Development Bank (ADB) study, there are 145 economic zones in the subregion. These include those that are already operating and those still being developed. The study highlights that cooperation enables countries to augment the spatial capabilities by ensuring access to subregional resources and markets, which they can use to compete for more investment in their respective zones.[5] (ADB 2022).

[2] https://imtgt.org/
[3] https://data.aseanstats.org/trade-annually
[4] https://bimp-eaga.asia/
[5] Special Economic Zones for Shared Prosperity: Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area. ADB, Manila. November 2022.

Building on the Spatial Capabilities in IMEC: India, West Asia, Europe, and North Africa

The IMEC is constituted of the important economies of India, UAE, Sudi Arabia, Italy, Greece, Germany, EU, and the US. If the economic connectivity in the IMEC is to work successfully through increased trade and investment, successful solar energy connectivity and energy transition plans, transport and ICT connectivity, and human resource development then the capabilities of the countries in and around IMEC, especially the manufacturing and services capabilities and GVC participation must be seamlessly harnessed.

The crisis of Suez Canal and vessels mobility should not be central to the economic mapping of IMEC. The production capacities and the natural capital of the regions in and around the IMEC must form the natural economic growth area of IMEC plan or economic influence. When Asia connects with Africa, or with Europe, the GVC integration takes place within the sub-regions. In that scenario, including the production capacities of countries around the Suez Canal, especially in North Africa in the IMEC cooperation and connectivity should be important. It is also significant that West Asian members of IMEC have close relations with North Africa, especially Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, and also with Türkiye. The West Asia North Africa (WANA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA regions are used interchangeably for reporting of and manufacturing scales and productivity in West Asia and North Africa.

One reason why regional value chain activity is lower in North Africa and West Asia than elsewhere may be related to lack of regional integration. Regional integration lowers transaction costs and smoothens the functioning of regional value chains, presenting an opportunity for development. Regional integration agreements generally build on existing multilateral agreements by deepening multilateral commitments further such as further reductions in tariffs. Increasingly, they contain provisions that are currently not in WTO rules (called 'WTO-extra' provisions, such as those related to investment, capital movement or competition policy). (ITC 2017).

Spatial Expansion of IMEC into North Africa for Manufacturing Activities

International value chains for manufacturing function around a regional hub. The potential of developing Asia and Africa to connect to regional or global markets greatly depends on the extent of value chain activity within the region. Policies, institutions, and private sector activity in neighbouring countries of the IMEC are therefore relevant. Together, these will

determine the capacity of a region or sub-region to attract lead firms, establish regional value chains, or link suppliers to lead firms in other regions.[6]

Asia's competitiveness comes from manufacturing and supply chain integration, which is at the core of industries integrated into the GVCs in the Indo-Pacific; yet in the context of, for example, resource-rich Africa and some parts of Middle East and West Asia, industrial activities around the processing and refining of raw commodities would be a significant aspect of industrialisation-led growth. This aspect is now central to the supply chains of critical minerals where like-minded countries in the G7 and G20 are coming together to establish more resilient and transparent supply chains. Critical minerals are also at the heart of industries and applications in the digital economy and for goods of the future. (Prakash, Chen, Shrestha 2025)

The onset of digital economy and its aspects of cooperation requires a separate though related discussion. Manufacturing, however, will not diminish with the onset of the digital economy. It will still provide most of the volume to international trade and will be a source of employment and growth in both the developing and developed world and the IMEC region is no different. However, the nature of manufacturing and the value chains of production and consumption will be affected. Changes in the location of production and consumption requires developing Asia and Europe to prepare for the changing nature of GVCs. This necessitates bringing in more producers and markets together in the IMEC economic clusters.

There is still wide divergence in manufacturing capacities and GVC participation amongst the different regions of the world, and therefore, within the IMEC. Two important indicators of industrial development – manufacturing value added[7] and manufacturing exports – require policy attention for inclusive GVCs and increased economic growth in the IMEC through expansion and cooperation.

[6] ITC, Trade Map, https://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx

[7] Manufacturing value added per capita, especially in the developing world, presents a more realistic picture of a region's employment-led growth through industrial production, exports, and trade integration. It also signifies the level of participation in value chains (ERIA, 2022).

Figure 2. Region-wise Manufacturing Value Added and Manufacturing Value Added Per Capita, 2024 (US$)



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators [accessed 12 September 2025].

Note: Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) divisions 15–37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for the depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by ISIC, revision 3.

Asia is the powerhouse of manufacturing. Despite several developing countries in East Asia, this region is far ahead of others and nearing the manufacturing value added of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members. (Figure 2). In the IMEC region, in 2024, the MVA for India was US$ 490 billion. In the same year, the cumulative MVA of two important economies in West Asia – UAE and Saudi Arabia is US$ 249 billion. The four important economies of North Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, and Ghana) reported a combined MVA of US$ 109 billion in 2024, while Türkiye's MVA was US$ 219 billion in the same year, as reported in the World Bank's development indicators. (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Manufacturing Value Added per Capita in the IMEC Extended Growth Area, 2024, (US$)



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.

After including the EU – with a reported MVA of US$ 2,722 billion in 2024 - the real opportunity for IMEC lies in consolidating the MVA of South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and the EU to maximise the manufacturing capacities in these regions. The existing trade and connectivity between these important groups and countries will help in realising the IMEC's expanded economic growth area.

Investments are Crucial for Deepening the GVC Clusters

Economic clusters are often organically formed geographic concentration of highly interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, and service providers (investment and other business consultants; and academic, financial, and technological institutions) linked by commonalities and complementarities without a clearly demarcated geographical boundary (Porter 1998). The GVC clusters in Southeast Asia and East Asia amplify this model and are at the centre of the global economic vibrancy. This region has, over the years, provided buoyancy to international trade and has been the largest recipient of investment (Figure 4).

Figure 4 also shows that in 2024, Africa registered a remarkable rebound in FDI inflows, which increased by 75 per cent to reach $97 billion. This figure accounted for 6 per cent of global FDI inflows, up from 4 per cent the previous year, and 11 per cent of total FDI to developing economies, compared with just 6 per cent in 2023. (UNCTAD 2025). This exceptional growth was largely attributable to a single megaproject: the Ras El-Hekma

urban development deal in Egypt. Net of the increase in Egypt, FDI flows to Africa were still up 12 per cent, but they remained modest at about $62 billion, or 4 per cent of global FDI.

Figure 4. Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-regions of North and East Africa, and Asia

(US$ Billion and percentage change)



Source: Author's re-arrangement of data from World Investment Report 2025, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

FDI flows increased across most of Africa. North Africa emerged as the main growth engine. In addition to the strong growth in Egypt, FDI in Tunisia rose by 21 per cent to $936 million and FDI in Morocco increased by 55 per cent to $1.6 billion. North Africa also registered growth in greenfield project with values increasing by 12 per cent to $76 billion, accounting for two thirds of total project capital expenditures on the continent. Egypt was the principal driver of this growth, recording a 30 per cent increase in greenfield project value, along with a 4 per cent rise in number.

IMEC Must Build on the Trade and Manufacturing Centres in Asia, Africa and Europe

Reimaging the IMEC as an organically arranged group of production centers and markets with their respective competitiveness presents the opportunity to realise the principles of peace, prosperity and democracy along the corridor. For this, the IMEC plan must be spatial, not linear. The successful economic corridor plans in Asia, such as the Mekong India Economic Corridor, Asia Highway, Greater Mekong Sub-region are all spatial in

nature, accommodating the economic value of growth nodes along the way. Consolidating the trade and investments in the IMEC region will help the economic clusters in Asia, North Africa to grow organically, thus bringing in the spontaneity and dynamism of Asia and Pacific into the IMEC region. (Table 1).

Table 1. Trade in Goods among the IMEC Countries and in North Africa, US$ Billion, 2023

	India	UAE	Qatar	Bahrain	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Türkiye	Morocco	Italy	Germany	France	Greece	EU-27
India		33.0	1.7	0.8	10.8	4.0	7.6	1.1	8.4	9.7	7.2	0.8	75.2
UAE	33.0		7.9	4.7	29.5	4.5	18.7	0.8	1.6	1.8	1.4	0.2	16.0
Qatar	1.7	7.9		0.0	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.2	3.4	0.1	1.6	0.0	10.7
Bahrain	0.8	4.7	0.0		2.9	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.7
Saudi Arabia	10.8	29.5	0.6	2.9		7.5	4.2	1.5	4.9	0.8	6.4	1.0	38.5
Egypt	4.0	4.5	0.1	0.5	7.5		3.8	0.8	3.1	0.8	0.9	1.6	11.9
Türkiye	7.6	18.7	0.4	0.4	4.2	3.8		3.1	12.4	21.1	10.3	4.2	106.7
Morocco	1.1	0.8	0.2	0.2	1.5	0.8	3.1		2.2	1.8	8.7	0.1	27.0
Italy	8.4	1.6	3.4	0.3	4.9	3.1	12.4	2.2		80.7	68.5	7.4	347.4
Germany	9.7	1.8	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.8	21.1	1.8	80.7		128.1	8.9	915.3
France	7.2	1.4	1.6	0.1	6.4	0.9	10.3	8.7	68.5	128.1		4.5	356.6
Greece	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.1	1.0	1.6	4.2	0.1	7.4	8.9	4.5		30.9
EU-27	75.2	16.0	10.7	1.7	38.5	11.9	106.7	27.0	347.4	915.3	356.6	30.9	4187.6

Source: Authors Arrangement. Trade Map, International Trade Centre 2024.

Note: Data has been adjusted to one decimal point.

North Africa is Compatible to IMEC's Economic Cluster Plan

Geographically, the industrial activities and the MVA are higher in the more industrialized regions of North and South Africa. North Africa, however, provides spatial economic connectivity with West Asia and Europe offering a natural partnership in IMEC manufacturing activities. North Africa has the potential to emerge as the inter-linked trade hub with Asia and Europe. Manufacturing continues to grow above 3 percent annually between 2014 and 2023 - putting Africa ahead of all other regions in the world. In 2023, textiles, transport vehicles, electronics and machinery constituted above 10 percent of North Africa's total exports to world, by value. (Figure 5 and Figure 6). While construction and resources continue to attract largest investments, manufacturing is now among the top sectors for investment flows into Africa, accounting for about a quarter of total FDI in 2024.

Figure 5. Major Exports in Countries of Interest in Africa and Türkiye



Source: ITC Trade Map 2025.

Note: Percentage shown is only for top 2 to 5 products exported by the countries-of interest where the products' share is more than 5% of total exports value. Red spheres show percentage contribution of labour-intensive manufacturing sectors of textiles and clothes (HS 50-63) and machinery and electronics (HS 84-85) in total exports.

Figure 6. Export of Labour-Intensive Goods (HS 50-89) from North Africa and Türkiye

Exports Value in US$ Million, Product Group's Contribution in %



Source: ITC Trade Map 2025.

Note: This figure shows the performance of labour-intensive goods (from HS Code 50 to 89) in North Africa and Türkiye, representing the broad manufacturing capacities in these countries.

Policy Recommendation

IMEC is more than an economic or infrastructure corridor. It is a spatial plan for developing Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa, which requires a higher level of *de jure* and *de facto* economic integration than now.[8] Asia, Africa and Europe consist of countries and regions widely different in their development stages with diversified historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. Any economic and infrastructure connectivity among the three must reconcile two objectives, i.e., deepening economic cooperation and trade integration, and also narrowing development gaps at the same time. All policy discussions and research in the IMEC must follow this pathway to economic growth.

East Asia became a forerunner of developing international production networks because of its novel policy regime for trade and investment. The high productivity of this

[8] This explanation is based on Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP) where Fukunari Kimura explains the concept of spatial design of economic infrastructure and industrial placement based on new waves of international trade theory: the extended fragmentation theory and new economic geography. See reference.

region is largely due to fragmentation of production and industrial agglomeration. This industrial agglomeration is seen in both developing and developed regions, such as Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Mekong region.

The IMEC region of economic growth will also require similar linking of the production centres in India, Middle East and West Asia, Egypt, Turkey and the EU.

This policy brief provides an outline for a wide spatial design of IMEC where economic infrastructure and GVC clusters function organically in the contiguous regions in and around the IMEC's planned corridor. In this design, North Africa - especially Egypt and Morocco - and Türkiye are the extended and complementary centers of manufacturing, markets, and industrial placement. These economies deepen and complement the economic connectivity in the IMEC and policy dialogue among partners must evaluate the evidence for constructing an inclusive and prosperous IMEC region.

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