China's Economic & Geopolitical Statecraft in the Global South

Insights from the NDB, AIIB & Latin America and the Caribbean





THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Prof. Alvaro Mendez Cairo 19 February 2024 a.mendez@lse.ac.uk Twitter @alvaroimendez



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Professor Alvaro Mendez

Senior Research Fellow, Director of the LSE Global South Unit and Academic Director, LSE IDEAS Department of International Relations



Welcome to my first lecture Dr. Alvaro Mendez <u>a.mendez@lse.ac.uk</u>










Introduction

SciencesPo



"Colombian Agency & US Foreign Policy"




ntervention by Invitation


Álvaro Méndez



"Global Governance in Foreign Policy"







"The China & Latin America Axis"

THE CHINA-LATIN AMERICA AXIS

Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly Globalised World





Introduction

Mendez, Alvaro. (2019). Latin America and the AllB: Interests and Viewpoints. *Global Policy* doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12733 (JIF = 1.197). Q3



Latin America and the AIIB: Interests and Viewpoints

Alvaro Mendez

Abstract

This essay gives insight into the interaction of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The AIIB has expressed a clear interest in LAC, accepting eight countries as 'prospective' members pending paying-in their capital, but LAC shows almost no stamina. It is the world's only region lacking even one paid-in member. So long as Beijing backs the request, prospective membership only requires writing a few letters. But LAC's inertia in officially joining, by passing legislation and making their capital contribution, is puzzling, given the benefits that lie untapped. The likeliest cause is their own culture of sheer negligent short-sightedness ('let's do it *mañana*'). This tendency to adjourn the acid test of action could be mitigated if countries in the region adopt long-term non-partisan National Development Plans to strengthen their institutional policy-making capacity. For their part, the AIIB's Governors and Beijing, despite their initial keen interest in LAC, have had to give up nudging and adapt themselves to the Latin Americans' labile perception of time in order to conserve their public image. They must remind LAC that only paid-in members receive financial benefits.





"New Development Assistance"

GOVERNING CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY Series Editors: Zhimin Chen · Yijia Jing

"In New Development Assistance (NDA): Emerging Economies and the New Landscape of Development Assistance scholars Yijia Jing, Álvaro Méndez and Yu Zheng have presented an outstanding collection bringing together some of the finest thinking on development assistance. Each contribution by a respected scholar, practitioner or policy-maker gives a readable account of the new vision of inclusive international development assistance from the standpoint of its impact on the Global South. In an era of monumental changes in the landscape of development assistance, this timely book will shape debates in the field for years to come"

-Enrique García, Former President of CAF – Development Bank of Latin America.

This book explores the changing face of development assistance. China's One Belt, One Road development program is the largest international investment scheme in history, surpassing the Marshall Plan by an order of magnitude. In 2017, a group of top scholars from Fudan, the London School of Economics, and other institutions like the Institute of Development Studies, Australian National University, and World Bank gathered to share findings and ideas about the nature of New Development Assistance. A compilation of their findings, this book will be of interest to NGOs, policymakers, and academics.

Yija Jing is a Changjiang Scholar, Seaker Chan Chair Professor of Public Management, and Dean of the Institute for Global Public Policy of Fudan University. He is editor-in-chief of *Fudan Public Administration Review* and coeditor of International Public Management Journal.

Alvaro Mendez is co-director of the Global South Unit and a Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. His most recent publications include: Global Governance in Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2018); and The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and their Role in an Increasingly Globalised World (Palgrave, 2018).

Yu Zheng is a Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. He is the author of *Governance and Foreign Investment in China, India, and Taiwan: Credibility, Flexibility, and International Business* (University of Michigan Press).





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New Development Assistance Edited by Yijia Jing · Alvaro Mendez · Yu Zheng **GOVERNING CHINA**

New

IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Edited by Yijia Jing Alvaro Mendez · Yu Zheng


Emerging Economies and the

New Landscape of Development Assistance

Development Assistance

> palgrave macmillan

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Review for this Journal

Open Access Article

Sustainable Banking: The Role of Multilateral Development Banks as Norm Entrepreneurs

by \mathbb{Q} Alvaro Mendez ^{1,2,*} \square and \mathbb{Q} David Patrick Houghton ³ \square

Introduction



Published

19 March 2020

The Political Economy of China–Latin America Relations Alwan Mandez - Mariano Turzi

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palgrave

palgrave+pivot


The Political Economy of China–Latin America Relations The AIIB Membership

Alvaro Mendez Mariano Turzi

> palgrave macmillan

Introduction

Mendez, Alvaro, & Alden, Chris. (2021). China in Panama: From Peripheral Diplomacy to Grand Strategy. *Geopolitics*, Vol. 26 (838-860)



GEOPOLITICS 2021, VOL. 26, NO. 3, 838–860 https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1657413



Check for updates

China in Panama: From Peripheral Diplomacy to Grand Strategy

Alvaro Mendez^{a,b} and Chris Alden^c

Routledge



Journal of Business Research 146 (2022) 277-287



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres

How sustainable banking fosters the SDG 10 in weak institutional environments

Fernando Úbeda^a, Francisco Javier Forcadell^b, Elisa Aracil^{c,d}, Alvaro Mendez^{e,f,*}








Manuel Alcántara • Alicia Bárcena • Jorge Castañeda Rut Diamint • Francisco Javier Forcadell • Álvaro Méndez Luis Felipe López-Calva • Andrés Malamud • Lorena Ruano Sebastián Nieto Parra • Tatiana Revilla • Diego Sánchez-Ancochec

Coordinación: Gaspard Estrada

JOURNAL OF RESEARCH







GP Opinion / The New Development Bank and Uruguay: A Win-Win Deal

The New Development Bank and Uruguay: A Win-Win Deal

By Alvaro Mendez - 13 June 2022 🛛 🏟 DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY



This is part of in a new collection of commentaries from the Emerging Global Governance (EGG) Project on the New Development Bank's evolution. Browse the series here. Alvaro Mendez argues that Uruguay's accession to the NDB has numerous benefits for both the country and the Bank.

In July 2020, upon arrival the current president of the New Development Bank (NDB), Marcos Troyjo took the decision to recruit new members.

From the Journal

DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY



USIP 2023




Ecuador & Panama and their Engagement with China* (Security Implications)



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE





14

* to be published in late 2023





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POLICY INSIGHTS 🔂 Open Access

Latin American agency: The New Development Bank, Uruguay's accession and Brazilian influence


Alvaro Mendez 🔀

First published: 04 May 2023 | https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13214



China and Central Asia 10 October 2023





<u>Home</u> > <u>The Great Power Competition Volume 5</u> > Chapter

Russia's Backyard: China and Central Asia after the Invasion of Ukraine

 $\underline{\mathsf{Alvaro}\;\mathsf{Mendez}}\,{}^{\textstyle{\textstyle{\textstyle{\boxtimes}}}}$

Chapter | First Online: 10 October 2023

35 Accesses 2 Altmetric

China – EU & Mercosur 2024



Latin America's Diplomacy: Balancing EU and China With Mercosur



Paraguay's President Santiago Peña (L), Brazil's President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (C), and Bolivia's President Luis Arce talk during a ceremony of announcements of investments in Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia on the second day of the Mercosur summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on December 7, 2023. Daniel RAMALHO / AFP

By Alvaro Mendez and Chris Alden



ÉTAT DES LIEUX DE LA PRÉSENCE CHINOISE EN AMÉRIQUE LATINE ET CARAIBES

1	Space Affairs les affaires spatiales
2	Raw materials and strategic supplies les matières premières et approvisionnements stratégiques
3	Infrastructure and Logistics terminal projects les projets d'infrastructures et terminaux logistiques
4	les bases industrielles et technologiques de défense (BITD)
5	l'énergie et les télécommunications



Today's lecture on the NDB & AIIB & LAC



Today's story serves as a means to show how things are working in terms of Chinese economic and geopolitical statecraft in the world, with an emphasis on China and Latin America. Four reasons.

- 1. China knows a lot about countries in the global South, we know little about the PRC
- 2. Chinese foreign policy difficult to study (black box)
- 3. These MDBs provide a window
- 4. Case studies also enchance our understanding of Beijin's playbook.

Some questions to think about it for our discussion




- **1. Global Strategy**: How does China's global strategy reflect its ambitions for economic and geopolitical influence worldwide?
- **2. Influence Through Institutions**: How has China used international institutions to enhance its global presence?
- **3. Engagement Risks and Opportunities**: What are the main risks and opportunities for countries engaging with China?
- **4. Latin America as a Case Study**: How does China's involvement in Latin America illustrate its economic and geopolitical tactics?
- **5. Future of China-Latin America Relations**: What are the prospects for China's relationship with Latin American countries, considering current trends?

Keen to learn more about this from you....

Egypt's Strategic Partnership with China: Opportunities and Implications

Jan 27, 2023 | Khalil Al-Anani



Egypt and China have a long history of diplomatic relations, dating back to the 1956.

Egypt was the <u>first</u> Arab and African nation to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.





China's Economic & Geopolitical Statecraft in the Global South

Insights from the NDB, AIIB & Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)

Rich literature on major Bretton Woods MDBs



1944

Located in Washington



1959 Located in Washington



1963

Located in Abidjan, Ivory Coast



1966

Located in Manila



1991

Located in London



More literatura needed on new MDBs



	Global Public Policy and Governance
跷 <u>Editorial b</u>	oard Diama Aims and scope Diama Di

Call for Papers: New Development Finance in the Global South: Beyond Bretton Woods

New Development Finance in the Global South: 🖸

I am the editor of this special Issue – I would like to have a Submission from the Egyptian Perspective – <u>a.mendez@lse.ac.uk</u>

The New Development Bank (aka BRICS Bank – based in Shanghai).








Shanghai, China

Capitalization of the NDB US \$100 Billion (2021)



Politicization



Examining the role Brazil's first female president will play on a global scale

By Milan Sime Martinic | Updated: February 12, 2023 10:24 IST

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New Development Bank (NDB)

- The New Development Bank (NDB), informally known as "the BRICS Bank", is a multilateral development bank (MDB) based in Beijing
- The first discussions on creating the NDB got started in 2012 when the leaders of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) met at their fourth Summit in India.




New Development Bank (NDB)

- In 2013, the BRICS leaders agreed to create the institution with themselves as the sole founding members.
- The Articles of Agreement were signed a year later at their sixth Summit in Brazil in July 2014 and entered into force in July 2015.
- The NDB became fully operational when it opened its headquarters in Shanghai in February 2016.



NDB's Membership









The Evolution of the New Development Bank (NDB) at Six and Beyond - A New Commentary Series

By Gregory T. Chin - 14 April 2022 | 🏚 Development, inequality and poverty



POLICY INSIGHTS 🔂 Open Access

Latin American agency: The New Development Bank, Uruguay's accession and Brazilian influence

Alvaro Mendez 🔀



Now – let's look at the AIIB (based in Beijing)













- The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral development bank (MDB) whose mission is financing the Infrastructure.
- AllB commenced in Beijing, Jan 2016
- Expanded to 109 members globally by Nov 2023
- Capitalized at \$100 billion
- Holds a Triple-A credit rating

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank



 China proposed AllB in Oct 2013 at APEC Summit in Bali

• Faced US and Japan opposition

Bank's agreement signed two years later

2014 Humble beginning – MoU



MoU to establish the AIIB signed only by 27 countries in October 2014.



2014 - US Lobbying against joining the AIIB



Washington saw (and still sees the AIIB as a geopolitical tool against the existing Bretton Woods system.









AllB in 2015 – a challenging year for the AllB



- Beijing wanted more nations to join the bank as founding members (particularly countries from the West).
- Deadline: 31 March 2015 to get more members
- Very difficult to achieve!
- Washington continued lobbying to "<u>ensure membership in the bank</u> <u>would be limited to smaller countries</u>" (Mendez, 2020).

UK ignores Washington: 12 March 2012

UK breaks Washington's heart!



• The world historical turning-point came on 12 March 2015 when the United Kingdom ignored Washington and decided to pledge to join the bank as a founding member.




2015 - AIIB SNOWBALL EFFECT



- UK challenged the US and then many other countries did so else did so
- Triggered a chain reaction
- France, Germany, Italy joined AIIB on March 17, 2015
- Switzerland followed shortly after
- South Korea joined on March 26
- Australia, Russia, Brazil on March 29
- Over 50 countries joined by March 31, 2015 deadline

AIIB – Obama upset by Cameron




LSE



Participants of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

U.S. says



2015 – AIIB Founding Members (a few from the Middle East)





AIIB founding members

Source: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

29 June 2015 – Signing of the Articles of Agreement



AllB opened its doors (16 January 2016)





Annual Meetings: China (2016); Korea (2017)





「CPP 復生大学全球公共政策研究院 Institute for Global Public Policy, Fudan University The AIIB versus the World Bank (1)



- What are the differences?
- There are more similarities than differences
- I argue that the The AIIB is nested to the World Bank (and the ADB), thus firmly situated within the existing international financial order. But China is now further away from the US-led international structure.
- The US and Japan are not members of the AIIB.

The AIIB versus the World Bank (2)



AllB architecture designed by former World Bank official: Natalie Lichtenstein.



- Bank also led by a former World Bank official: Jin Liqun
- Internationally the AllB is led by Sir Dany Alexander (Lib Dem UK)

The AIIB versus the World Bank (3b)



 All members are entitled to borrow from the bank (unlike most MDBs where you have non-borrowing and borrowing members).

Key for the global South and Beyond

Article 11 Recipients and Methods of Operation

1. (a) The Bank may provide or facilitate financing to any member, or any agency, instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, or any entity or enterprise operating in the territory of a member, as well as to international or regional agencies or entities concerned with economic development of the region.

The AIIB versus the World Bank (3a)

Operational Focus:



- World Bank: Broad, includes infrastructure and education.
- AllB: Specialized in Asian infrastructure.
- Governance:
 - AIIB: Streamlined structure, fewer bureaucratic layers for efficiency.
 - Claims less conditionality and has a non-resident board to reduce costs.
- Project Approval:
 - AIIB strives for speed and efficiency with a strong track record in due diligence

AIIB beyond Asia



- Latin America: There are six membera
- North Amrica (e.g. Canada)
- Africa 15 full members
- Europe 25 full members

AllB & the World: Europe




Europe (geographically)

- 1. Austria 2015: \$500.8 million
- 2. Belarus 2019: \$64.1 million
- 3. Belgium 2019: \$284.6 million
- 4. Croatia 2021: \$5.0 million
- 5. **Denmark -** 2016: \$369.5 million
- 6. Finland 2016: \$310.3 million
- 7. France 2016: \$3,375.6 million
- 8. Germany 2015: \$4,484.2 million
- 9. Greece 2019: \$10.0 million
- 10. Hungary 2017: \$100.0 million

- 14. Luxembourg 2015: \$69.7 million
- 15. Malta 2016: \$13.6 million
- 16. Netherlands 2015: \$1,031.3 mill
- 17. Norway 2015: \$550.6 million
- 18. **Poland -** 2016: \$831.8 million
- 19. **Portugal** 2017: \$65.0 million
- 20. Romania 2018: \$153.0 million
- 21. Serbia 2019: \$5.0 million
- 22. **Spain** 2017: \$1,761.5 million
- 23. Sweden 2016: \$630.0 million
- 24. Switzerland 2016: \$706.4 million
- 25. UK- 2015: \$3,054.7 million

AIIB in the global South: Latin America





AIIB & Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)



Latin America

- 1. Argentina 2021: \$5.0 million
- 2. Brazil 2020: \$5.0 million
- 3. **Chile** 2021: \$10.0 million
- 4. Ecuador 2019: \$5.0 million
- 5. **Peru -** 2022: \$154.6 million
- 6. Uruguay 2020: \$5.0 million


North America

1. **Canada** - 2018: \$995.4 million

AIIB in the Global South: Africa







AIIB African Full Members 2024⁺



- 1. Algeria 2019: \$5.0 million
- 2. Benin 2020: \$5.0 million
- 3. Côte d'Ivoire 2020: \$5.0 million
- 4. Egypt 2016: \$650.5 million
- 5. Ethiopia 2017: \$45.8 million
- 6. Ghana 2020: \$5.0 million
- 7. Guinea 2019: \$5.0 million
- 8. Libya 2023: \$52.6 million

- 9. Madagascar 2018: \$5.0 million
- 10. Morocco 2022: \$5.0 million
- 11. Rwanda 2020: \$5.0 million
- 12. South Africa 2023: \$5.0 million
- 13. Sudan 2018: \$59.0 million
- 14. Togo 2023: \$5.0 million
- 15. Tunisia 2022: \$5.0 million

† Egypt is non-regiaonal founding member. Three are other "prospective"
 members like South Africa who has not completed its membership

Egypt (first non-regional country to get a project approved by the AIIB)



2023 Egypt Multi-sector Sovereign Egypt: Egypt: Egypt: Egypt: Subtainable Transport and Digital UVEW DETALS Approved Financing: USD200 million Approved 2022 Egypt Transport Sovereign Egypt: Alexandria – Abou Qir Metro Line VEW DETALS Approved Financing: EUR250 million Approved 2021 Egypt CAF- Economic Resilence/PF Sovereign Egypt: Inclusive Growth for Sustainable Recovery DPF Program Approved Financing: USD360 million Approved 2021 Egypt CAF- Resilence/PF Sovereign Egypt: Inclusive Growth for Sustainable Recovery DPF Program Approved Financing: USD360 million Approved 2019 Egypt Multi-sector Nonsovereign Egypt: National Bank of Egypt On-Lending Facility for Intrastructure Approved Financing: USD360 million Approved 2018 Egypt Multi-sector Nonsovereign Egypt: Sustainable Rural Santation Services Program, VEW DETALS Approved Financing: USD300 million Approved 2017 Egypt Energy Nonsovereign Egypt: Eg		APPROVAL YEAR	MEMBER	SECTOR	FINANCING TYPE	PROJECT NAME	FINANCING AMOUNT	STATUS
SN VEW DETAILS VEW DETAILS Approved Financing: USD360 million Approved 2021 Egypt CRF- Resilience/PBF Sovereign Egypt: Inclusive Growth for Sustainable Recovery DPF Approved Financing: USD360 million Approved 2019 Egypt Multi-sector Nonsovereign Egypt: National Bank of Egypt On-Lending Facility for Intrastructure Approved Financing: USD150 million Approved 2018 Egypt Water Sovereign Sovereign Egypt: Sustainable Rural Santation Services Program, VIEW DETAILS Approved Financing: USD300 million Approved 2017 Egypt Energy Nonsovereign Egypt: Egypt Round II Solar PV Feed-in Tariffs Program Approved Financing: USD210 million Approved		2023	Egypt	Multi-sector	Sovereign	Infrastructure Guarantee	Approved Financing: USD200 million	Approved
Economic Resilience/PBF Program Interview Int		2022	Egypt	Transport	Sovereign		Approved Financing: EUR250 million	Approved
2018 Egypt Water Sovereign Egypt: Sustainable Rural Santation Services Program, Approved Financing: USD300 million Approved 2017 Egypt Energy Nonsovereign Egypt: Egypt Round II Solar PV Feed-in Tariffs Program Approved Financing: USD210 million Approved		2021	Egypt	Economic		Program	Approved Financing: USD360 million	Approved
2017 Egypt Energy Nonsovereign Egypt: Egypt Round II Solar PV Feed-in Tariffs Program Approved Financing: USD210 million Approved		2019	Egypt	Multi-sector	Nonsovereign	Infrastructure	Approved Financing: USD150 million	Approved
		2018	Egypt	Water	Sovereign	Phase-2	Approved Financing: USD300 million	Approved
		2017	Egypt	Energy	Nonsovereign		Approved Financing: USD210 million	Approved

2023 Annual Meeting (Egypt)





Inauguration of AIIB's UAE Office "AIIB Abu Dhabi Hub"



• One of the key milestones in AIIB's short history is the inauguration of its first overseas office in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

• This office strategically positions AIIB as a hub connecting the bank with Europe, Middle East and Africa.

Abu Dhabi Hub (19 September 2023)





Challenges and Future Prospects

LSE

- \checkmark US (and Japan) likely to continue opposing the Bank (at least publicly).
- \checkmark The Abu Dhabi hub likely to serve as a bridge between the AIIB outside Asia
- ✓ The hub will facilitate more loans in the region too (some projects in the pipeline Oman).
- ✓ Wealthy members like Saudi Arabia and UAE likely to access funds too.
- ✓ Infrastructure key to peace-building officials at the AIIB acknowledge this in private (particularly EU officials).

Global Policy Special Issue on the AIIB (2019-2020 – top articles to date)

Special Section I

The AllB in Global Perspective: Early Development, Innovation and Future Agenda Edited by Gregory T. Chin, Giuseppe Gabusi, Carla P. Freeman, Giovanni B. Andornino *This special section is dedicated to Robert W. Cox, who inspired generations of scholars*.



Special Section Article

Latin America and the AIIB: Interests and Viewpoints

Alvaro Mendez

First published: 13 September 2019 | https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12733 | Citations: 9





China's Econmic & Geopolitical Stacraft: the case of Latin America









DEVELOPMENT, AGENCY AND GEOPOLITICS CHRIS ALDEN And Álvaro méndez

61

Latin American Countries



1. Antigua and Barbuda

- 2. Argentina
- 3. Bahamas
- 4. Barbados
- 5. Belize
- 6. Bolivia
- 7. Brazil
- 8. Chile
- 9. Colombia
- 10. Costa Rica
- 11. Cuba

- 13. Dominican Republic
 14. Ecuador
 - 15. El Salvador
 - 16. Grenada
 - 17. Guatemala
 - 18. Guyana
 - 19. Haiti
 - 20. Honduras
 - 21. Jamaica
 - 22. Mexico

- Paraguay
 Peru
 Peru
 Saint Lucia
 St. Kitts and Nevis
 St. Vincent & the Grenadines
 Suriname
- 31. Trinidad and Tobago
- 32. Uruguay
- 33. Venezuela

2

POOR MEXICO, SO FAR FROM GOD AND SO CLOSE TO THE UNITED STATES.

- PORFIRIO DIAZ -

+- 1824

LIBQUOTES.COM



Poor Latin America, so far from God, the rest and so close to China.

Alvaro Mendez 2024



Early Cultural Diplomacy Asia and the Pacific Regional Peace Conference (1952)





Diplomatic History (1)

Asia and the Pacific Regional Peace Conference (1952) in Beijing

12 countries from the region sent 110 delegates to the conference.

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.

Early example of cultural diplomacy

Cultural Delegations – 1950s



- During the 1949-1960s period a high percentage of the Latin American visitors to China came in so-called *cultural delegations*.
- Teachers, physicians, lawyers, journalists, and other professionals were of particular interest to the Chinese because of the great influence they had in their countries.
- Senator <u>Salvador Allende</u> (later President) led a ten-man delegation from Chile in 1954 (professors, doctors, & lawyers).
- <u>Jacobo Arbenz</u> is said to have been in China a year or so after his overthrow in Guatemala (around 1955).

Good article: Ratliff, William E. (1969). Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949-1960. *The Hispanic American Historical Review, 49*(1), 53-79.

Diplomatic History (2)

1954: Chinese People's Association for Friendship is created

Beijing hesitant about LAC: Geography & Politics

VP Nixon in Peru in 1958

1960: China-Latin America and the Caribbean Friendship Association is created.



TIMES' OWN STORY OF NIXON RIOT



RED-GOADED PERU MOB STONES NIXON



onting students surge toward Vice, Peter

AIRCRAFT DISPUTE PEACE HOPE RISES 140 Believed Dead in Crash Dead in Crash

Industry Granted Respite From Union
Of Brazil Trains
of Brazil Trains
and Brazil Control and Control a

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BY ROBERT T. HARTMANN LIMA, May 8-Vice-President Nixon walked through a shower of stones ar

> d and cuffed by frenzied demonstrator I'd he glad to but don't you want the truth first

Rock Grazes Neck of

Vice-President as He

Defies Communists

American Flag Torn Away

By a Times Representative LIMA, May 8-Mortified Previous attempted to make embarrassed amends to Vice-President Nixon this afternoon for incidents in which the American Fing

2





China, Latin America & the Cold War

- Cuba established diplomatic relations with China on 28 September 1960.
- Cooperation between Havana and Beijing diminished drastically during the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.
- Ties with China were never broken but the engagement was minimized.

Cuba was the first country in LAC to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC (28 September 1960)













Cuba & China

2

UN Recognition

- On 25 October 1971, a large number of states voted to expel Taipei and seat Beijing at the UN.
- Seven of those countries were from Latin America: Cuba, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago.





LAC Countries Votes for UN *Resolution 2758* in favour of seating the PRC at the UN in 1971


otes in Favour (7 of 76)	Votes Against (12 of 35)	Abstained (5 of 17)
Chile	El Salvador	Argentina
Cuba	Bolivia	Barbados
Ecuador	Brazil	Colombia
Guyana	Costa Rica	Jamaica
Mexico	Dominican Republic	Panama
Peru	Guatemala	
Trinidad and Tobago	Haiti	
	Honduras	
	Nicaragua	
	Paraguay	
	Uruguay	
	Venezuela	

Source: Mendez (2020)

Egypt voted in favour



Incredible footage from 25 October 1971 3 parts (1) US pushing a two China Policy; (2) Draft resolution by Taipei to prevent consider PRC's membership (3) PRC's Membership







1. Cuba	Fidel Castro	Mao Zedong	28 September 1960
2. Chile	Salvador Allende	Mao Zedong	15 December 1970
3. Peru	Juan Velasco	Mao Zedong	02 November 1971
4. Mexico	Luis Echeverría	Mao Zedong	14 February 1972
5. Argentina	Alejandro Agustín	Lanusse Mao Zedong	19 February 1972
6. Guyana	Linden Forbes Bur	nham Mao Zedong	27 June 1972
7. Jamaica	Michael Manley	Mao Zedong	21 November 1972
8. Trinidad and Toba	go Eric Eustace Willia	ams Mao Zedong	20 June 1974
9. Venezuela	Carlos Andrés Pére	ez Mao Zedong	28 June 1974
10. Brazil	Ernesto Geisel	Mao Zedong	15 August 1974
11. Suriname	Johan Ferrier	Mao Zedong	28 May 1976
12. Barbados	Jon Michael Geoffi	rey Hua Guofeng	30 May 1977
13. Ecuador	Jaime Roldós Agui	lera Hua Guofeng	02 January 1980
14. Colombia	Julio César Turbay	Ayala Hua Guofeng	07 February 1980
15. Antigua and Barbu	da Vere Bird	Hu Yaobang	01 January 1983
16. Bolivia	Hernán Siles Zuazo	Hu Yaobang	09 July 1985
17. Grenada	Herbert Bleize	Hu Yaobang	01 October 1985 ¹
18. Uruguay	Julio María Sangui	netti Zhao Ziyang	03 February 1988
19. Bahamas	Hubert Ingraham	Jiang Zemin	23 May 1997
20. Dominica	Roosevelt Skerrit	Hu Jintao	23 March 2004
21. Costa Rica	Óscar Arias	Hu Jintao	01 June 2007
22. Panama	Juan Carlos Varela	Xi Jinping	12 June 2017
23. Dominican Republi	ic Danilo Medina	Xi Jinping	01 May 2018
24. El Salvador	Salvador Sánchez (Cerén Xi Jinping	21 August 2018
25. Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	Xi Jinping	10 December 2021
26. Honduras	Xiomara Castro	Xi Jinping	26 March 2023

PRC Diplomatic Relations with LAC 26 Countries 1960 - 2023

US did not establish ties with the PRC officially until 1979



The accession of China to the WTO in 2001 facilitated trade with the region when it was combined and enhanced by adoption of the strategic Go Out policy in 2001, as part of China's five year development plan.



NORLD



In 2018 the total volume of Chinese - Latin American trade was 25.5 times larger than it was in 2000

US\$306 BILLION IN 2018


(CRS, 2019)

Imports, Exports and Total trade between LAC and China	Imports, Exports and	l Total trac	le between	LAC and China
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
Year	Imports (US\$ bn)	Exports (US\$ bn)	Total trade (US\$ bn)
2000	8.31	3.86	<mark>12.17</mark>
2001	10.29	5.28	15.57
2002	12.40	6.51	18.91
2003	17.95	11.25	29.20
2004	27.72	14.33	42.05
2005	36.34	19.13	55.47
2006	54.40	23.14	77.54
2007	71.79	33.82	105.61
2008	96.00	39.55	135.55
2009	81.62	46.84	128.46
2010	120.34	67.81	188.15
2011	152.25	86.34	238.59
2012	165.27	83.80	249.07
2013	175.68	92.91	268.59
2014	175.59	85.06	260.65
2015	170.64	74.49	245.13
2016	157.20	74.38	231.58
2017	173.88	94.22	268.10
2018	193.11	122.52	315.63
2019	184.20	123.74	<mark>307.94</mark>

Source: Adapted by Authors from World Bank Data (<u>https://wits.worldbank.org/</u>)

Bar Chart - Trade between LAC and China 2000-2019



Source: Adapted by Authors from World Bank Data (https://wits.worldbank.org/)



China is now the LARGEST Trading partner of South America

The US still the largest trading Partner of the region as a whole



CHINA - LATIN AMERICA

CHILE

Signed in November 2005 by Ricardo Lagos, entered into force in October 2006.

In 2017 Chile and China agreed to upgrade their FTA.

The upgrade came into force on 1March 2019.This is only China'ssecond FTA upgrading agreementafter the China-ASEAN FTA

PERU

Signed on April 28, 2009 by Alan Garcia, entered into force in March 2010.

On 22 November 2016, Peru and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Optimization of the Peru-China FTA.

Peru & China are negotiating an upgrade of their FTA, but Lima has not been very clear with what it wants (due to domestic problems).

COSTA RICA

Signed in April 2010 by Oscar Arias, entered into force on August 1, 2011.

For China, goods trade covers products from textile industry, light industry, machinery, electronics, vegetables and fruits, automobiles, chemicals, and leather.

For Costa Rica, it covers coffee, beef, pork, pineapple juice, frozen orange juice, jam, fish powder, minerals and hides.

China – Ecuador FTA 2023 (Signed, but not ratified)



Ecuador's New Free Trade Pact With China Provokes Lots of Excitement and Even More Questions



The signing ceremony in Quito of Ecuador's new free trade agreement with China on May 12, 2023. Image via @Produccion_Ecu.

By Chris Alden and Alvaro Mendez

China – Nicaragua FTA (just signed in Sep 2023)



China, Nicaragua sign FTA, demonstrating resolve to deepen economic integration


By Global Times

Published: Aug 31, 2023 12:52 PM



New FTAs with China in the horizon?

Panama- Chna FTA 5 Rounds of negotiations, but things stalled in 2019, the door still open



Economy 09-07-2018

China and Panama begin negotiation rounds for the FTA

<u>China – Uruguay FTA</u> Ongoing negotiations but challenging due to Mercosur.





Xi Jinping in Latin America (LAC): 2013-2023

Visits by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Latin America (2013-2019)					
Date	Countries Visited				
June 2013	Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica & México				
July 2014	Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela & Cuba				
November 2016	Ecuador, Perú & Chile				
December 2018	Argentina & Panama				
November 2019	Brazil				
Source: Mendez (2020)					

After 10 years in office, Xi Jinping has visited **11** countries (Brazil & Argentina twice). He has not been to the region since 2019, but is planning to visit again in 2024.

This is more than President Obama, Trump, and Biden combined in 14 years.

Geopolitics


Taiwan in LAC is one of the geopolitical dimensions of the relationship of the region with China.

This is significant because Taiwan is <u>only</u> recognized by 12 countries around the world, more than 50% in LAC (7 in total).

Washington has tried to stop more countries switching diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing, but this has been rejected.

Taiwan and Lating America





Taiwan's critical battle to keep its diplomatic allies from switching sides



Latin America and Caribbean








Republic of Guatemala Haiti









Republic of Honduras



Maybe Paraguay?

→ Presidential Elections on 30 April 2023 – candidates have different views on Taiwan



la

Paraguay

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines



BRI & LAC

LAC Countries endorsing the BRI as of July 2023

LA	C Country	Endorsement Date
1.	Panama	17 November 2017
2.	Trinidad & Tobago	15 May 2018
3.	Antigua & Barbuda	6 June 2018
4.	Bolivia	19 June 2018
5.	Dominica	13 July 2018
6.	Guyana	27 July 2018
7.	Uruguay	20 August 2018
8.	Costa Rica	3 September 2018
9.	Venezuela	14 September 2018
10.	Grenada	21 September 2018
11.	Suriname	23 September 2018
12.	El Salvador	01 November 2018
13.	Chile	02 November 2018
14.	Dominican Republic	02 November 2018
15.	Cuba	09 November 2018
16.	Ecuador	14 December 2018
17.	Barbados	26 February 2019
18.	Jamaica	15 April 2019
19.	Peru	26 April 2019
20.	Nicaragua	12 January 2022
21.	Argentina	6 February 2022
22.	Honduras	13 June 2023

Source: Authors' table from multiple sources.

Four countries who have not endorsed the BRI as of 23 October 2023



- 1. Brazil (Xi wanted, but Lula did not do it)
- 2. Mexico (not likely due to US).
- 3. Colombia (Maybe?)
- 4. The Bahamas (not sure)

Plus of course the seven countries that do not have diplomatic ties with the PRC.

Why is France thinking about China in LAC?



NOTE D'ANALYSE

ÉTAT DES LIEUX DE LA PRÉSENCE CHINOISE EN AMÉRIQUE LATINE ET CARAIBES

Février 2024

Professor Alvaro Mendez, London School of Economics

Mr. Gaspard Estrada



Liberté Égalité Fraternité


What is the largest country bordering France?



French Guiana (Part of France)







LSE

Why is France thinking about China in Latin America?


<u>China has sold millions of dollars in military equipment</u> to diplomatic allies in LAC. This includes military aircraft, ground vehicles, air defence systems, and small arms sold to countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

Countries in CAC like <u>Cuba have also strengthened military ties with the PRC</u> by welcoming the People's Liberation Army Navy on several port visits.

The Dominican Republic abandoned Taiwan in 2018 and now has strong ties with China. It is likely that Haiti will abandon Taiwan also in the not so distant future.


The <u>proximity of Haiti</u> (and the DR as well) to <u>French overseas departments</u> like <u>Guadeloupe</u> and <u>Martinique</u> – and <u>French Guiana</u> in South America – is very relevant for France.

As the leading European force in the Caribbean, the France stations more than 3,000 military personnel there.



LSE

<u>Scenario 1 (short term):</u> <u>The One-China Policy is achieved throughout LAC </u>**†** *





† Hypothetical scenario


* The one-China Policy as seen by Beijing

<u>Scenario 2 (medium/long term): The PRC becomes a major</u> political and security actor in LAC ⁺





+ Hypothetical Scenario, but it is already happening in some respects. Defence cooperation, space agreements, surveillance



<u>Scenario 3 (disruptive): LAC becomes a theatre of operations in a</u> <u>global confrontation between Washington and Beijing</u> †

† Hypothetical Scenario

HNU QUESTIONS?

Please note that the UZBEKISTAN and TURKMENISTAN WERE NOT COVERED IN THE LECTURES. 1**92**02/2024

Egypt



WIIS World Integrated Trade Solution							f 🗾 in	6
ade Stats + Tariffs + Non-Tariff Measures + GVC + API+ ta Glance Summary Partner Product Group	Analytical database Tools -	Bulk Download				Home About	WITS Reference - 1	raining - Support Lini
a Glance Summary Partner Product Group								OHelp ∓ Custom Qu
75 B	Exports (in US\$ Mil):	40,702	Imports (in US\$ Mil): 4	73,781	Petroleum oils, etc,	6,030,910.77	 Petroleum oils, etc, 	3.805.966.07
$\sim \sim $	(i) No. Of products:	2,989	 No. Of products: 	4,060	 Natural gas, liquefi 	3,917,289.74	 Petroleum oils and o 	3,728,828.94
60 B	 No. Of partners: 	176	 No. Of partners: 	179	 Petroleum oils and o 	2,916,217.83	 Durum wheat 	2,463,551.00
					 Gold in unwrought fo 	1,080,555.00	(1) Maize (excl. seed)	2,410,682.8
45 B					Urea	1,078,607.98	(i) Other medicaments of .	. 2,260,269.6
30 B	TOP 5 EXPORT AND IMPORT PAR	RTNERS						
\sim \sim \sim	Market	(DTrade (US\$ Mil)	(1) Partner share(%)	Exporter	(i)	Trade (US\$ Mil)	Dartner share(%
15 B	(1) Unspecified		2,715 🚛	6.67	China		10,010 🛺	13.5
Import Export	(1) Turkey		2,647 🖧	6.50	(1) Unspecified		7,628	10.3
	(1) Italy		2,580 🚛	6.34	(1) Saudi Arabia		6,251 🖧	8.4
DUCTS	(1) India		2,327 🖧	5.72	(1) United States		5,105 🖧	6.9
	(1) United States		2,159 💑	5.30	Germany		3,297 ರ್ಥ	4.47
Vegetable Food Products	EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF PRO	DDUCT GROUPS						
Fuels			Exports			Imp	orts	
rueis	Product Categories		 Export(US\$ Mil) 	③ Product share(%)	Import(US\$ Mil)	(j) Prod	l share(%)	 Weighted Average (%)
	(1) Raw materials		6,619 5	16.26 🖧	18,123		24.56	

19**3**02/2024





China, 53 African countries that have established diplomatic relations with China and the Commission

of the African Union. The 54 African members are:

Algeria	Angola	Benin	Botswana	Burkina Faso
Burundi	Cabo Verde	Cameroon	Central Africa	Chad
Comoros	Congo	Cote d'Ivoire	Congo(Kinshasa)	Djibouti
Egypt	Equatorial Guinea	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Kenya
Lesotho	Liberia	Libya	Madagascar	Malawi
Mali	Mauritania	Mauritius	Morocco	Mozambique
Namibia	Niger	Nigeria	Rwanda	Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	Somalia	South Africa
South Sudan	Sudan	Tanzania	Тодо	Tunisia
Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe	The Commission of the African Union	